Invoice Redirection Fraud: How to Stop Scammers Hijacking Payments
Invoice redirection fraud sends customer payments to scammers. Learn the email, invoice and call-back controls distributors use to stop it before money moves.

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On this page 8 sections
- How Invoice Redirection Fraud Reaches Wholesale Buyers
- Why DMARC Won't Catch the Most Damaging Version
- Make Bank Details Something That Never Changes by Email
- The Call-Back Rule for Every Bank Change Request
- Walking One Redirected Payment Back Through the Controls
- The First 24 Hours After a Payment Goes to the Wrong Account
- Who Absorbs the Loss Is Often Decided Before the Fraud
- Take Bank Details Out of Email With a Payment Portal
Invoice redirection fraud is when a criminal poses as your company and convinces a customer to send an invoice payment to a bank account the criminal controls. Distributors can stop most of it with three habits: bank details that never change by email, a phone call to a number already on file before any payment change, and a payment channel that keeps account numbers out of the inbox. A redirected payment hurts you too: it usually leaves an open invoice and a customer who believes it's paid.
The scam is a form of business email compromise (BEC), and the dollars are large. The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) recorded 21,442 BEC complaints in 2024 and about $2.77 billion in reported losses, according to its 2024 Internet Crime Report. Nacha, which governs the ACH Network, noted that BEC ranked seventh by number of complaints but second by dollars lost, with nearly $8.5 billion reported from 2022 through 2024.
How Invoice Redirection Fraud Reaches Wholesale Buyers
Wholesale suits the scam. Invoices are large, buyers pay on predictable cycles like net 30, and much of the money moves by ACH or wire. Neither rail has a card-style chargeback, so once a buyer pushes funds to an account, getting them back depends on how fast the banks act.
The attack starts with access. The fraudster takes over a real mailbox (yours or the buyer's) or registers a look-alike domain with one letter swapped. A hijacked mailbox is worse, because the criminal can read months of order threads and learn who approves payments, how big the invoices run and when they come due.
Shortly before a large payment, the buyer gets a message that appears to come from your receivables team announcing new bank details. The reason sounds routine, like a new bank or an account under audit. The AP clerk edits the vendor record, the next ACH or wire goes out, and the money is moved onward quickly, often through several accounts. Weeks later your collections team calls about a past-due invoice and hears, "We paid that."
Why DMARC Won't Catch the Most Damaging Version
Many distributors set up SPF, DKIM and DMARC, the email authentication standards that let receiving servers check whether a message really came from your domain, and consider the problem handled. A DMARC policy set to quarantine or reject makes it much harder for anyone to send mail that falsely uses your exact domain, and it's far stronger than a monitoring-only policy.
Those standards do nothing against the two variants that cost wholesalers the most. A look-alike domain is a different domain, and whoever registered it can authenticate it properly, so its messages pass every check. A hijacked real mailbox sends genuine mail from your own systems. Either way, the filters see a legitimate email because, technically, it is one.
Email security shrinks exposure; the payment process is the real control. Still, ask your IT provider for multi-factor authentication (MFA) on every mailbox and alerts for new forwarding or inbox rules, unfamiliar sign-ins and look-alike domain registrations. A customer mentioning an email nobody on your team sent is often the first sign.
Make Bank Details Something That Never Changes by Email
Fake bank details work because remittance information travels as editable text in an inbox. At onboarding, tell customers in writing how they pay you and that your banking information will never change by email alone. Print a standing notice on every invoice and statement: "Our bank details will not change by email. If you receive a request to update them, call your account representative at the number on file before paying."
Send invoices as locked PDFs from your accounting system, always from the same address. If you vet buyers with trade credit applications before offering net 30 terms, use the same packet to record how each buyer will pay and who on their side may authorize changes. Internally, limit who can edit your own banking information and require two people to approve any change.
The Call-Back Rule for Every Bank Change Request
The most effective control fits on a sticky note: no bank detail change takes effect until someone confirms it by phone, using a number that was on file before the request arrived. It runs in both directions. Your customers should verify any request that seems to come from you, and your AP team should hold your own suppliers to the same rule.
A workable written policy has six parts:
- Call the number in the vendor master file or on a contract signed before the request, never one from the email, its signature block or an attached letter.
- Speak to a contact you already know, and ask something only the real vendor would know, such as a recent PO number or invoice amount.
- Have a second person in AP approve the change before it's saved.
- Send a small test payment and have the known contact confirm by phone that it arrived before you release a large invoice.
- Tell the original contact, through a separate channel, that the change was made.
- Log who called, which number was used, when, and who approved.
Urgency is the tell. Pressure to skip the call because "the truck won't ship until payment clears" is exactly the lever fraudsters pull, so the policy should state that nobody, including the owner, can override verification.
Walking One Redirected Payment Back Through the Controls
Here is an illustrative case. Assume a regional foodservice distributor invoices a restaurant group $38,500 on net 30 terms, and the group pays by ACH from its bank's online portal. An attacker phishes a sales rep's password; the mailbox has no MFA. On day 24, from the rep's real account, the attacker sends the group's controller a "new remittance details" letter with a doctored invoice on genuine letterhead.
| Point in the Attack | Control | What the Control Would Do |
|---|---|---|
| Day 0: stolen password used to sign in | MFA on the mailbox | Sign-in fails; attack ends |
| Days 1-23: attacker adds a rule hiding replies that mention "bank" | Inbox-rule alert | IT sees the rule and resets access |
| Day 24: email sent from the rep's real account | DMARC at reject | Message passes; no help here |
| Day 24: controller reads the request | "Never by email" invoice notice | Controller has a written reason to stop |
| Day 25: AP edits the vendor record | Call-back to number on file | Real rep says nothing changed; fraud stopped |
| Day 25: change submitted for saving | Dual approval | Second approver asks for the call log |
| Day 30: payment due | Payment portal on your website | No account number to swap |
Most of these controls cost little beyond setup and a few minutes per change. Now run the math if every control fails. Assume, for illustration, the distributor nets 5 cents of profit per dollar of sales and ends up absorbing the loss. Replacing $38,500 would take $770,000 of new sales ($38,500 ÷ 0.05). Show that number to whoever says call-backs slow down AP.
The First 24 Hours After a Payment Goes to the Wrong Account
Speed decides most outcomes. The FBI advises victims to immediately notify every financial institution involved, file a complaint at ic3.gov, and contact the nearest FBI field office and local law enforcement. Filing fast matters because IC3's Recovery Asset Team works with banks through the Financial Fraud Kill Chain to freeze funds, and the 2024 report says most incidents the team initiates are BEC.
The buyer who sent the money should call its bank's fraud line first and ask the bank to contact the receiving bank about a recall or freeze. It should also cancel scheduled payments to that account and keep every email, with full headers. ACH credits settle quickly (see how long an ACH transfer takes), wires are generally harder to pull back, and instant payments harder still. Only the bank can say what's possible for a given transfer.
The distributor whose name was used should secure email (reset passwords, end sessions, delete unknown rules, turn on MFA) and warn other customers by phone, since the attacker may hold your contact list. Notify your cyber insurer right away if you have coverage, because many policies have prompt-notice requirements. Both companies should write down a timeline while memories are fresh and talk to an attorney before saying anything about fault.
Who Absorbs the Loss Is Often Decided Before the Fraud
Distributors usually treat the invoice as still open; buyers usually argue they paid in good faith. A dispute can turn on whose systems were compromised, what the credit terms say about payment instructions, whether either side skipped an agreed verification step, how the banks handled the transfer, and state law, where courts have not reached consistent results. This is general information, not legal advice, so bring in an attorney and your insurer early.
The practical move is to settle the question in advance. Put your bank-change policy in your credit terms and onboarding documents, have buyers acknowledge it, and keep the proof. If an account still comes up short, our guide on handling wholesale deductions when a customer short-pays covers documenting the open balance without damaging the relationship.
Take Bank Details Out of Email With a Payment Portal
The structural fix is to stop sending bank details by email at all. A customer payment portal or hosted payment page lets buyers pay invoices by card or ACH at a web address you control, so there's no routing number in an inbox to swap. Fraudsters can still send fake "pay here" links, so publish the portal address on your website and in onboarding documents.
Setup options are covered in B2B customer payment portals that let buyers pay invoices online and, for invoices that come out of an ERP, adding card and ACH to NetSuite, Acumatica or QuickBooks. Accounts that prefer to read a card number to AR over the phone can be handled with a virtual terminal for keyed card payments. Card and ACH carry different costs and dispute exposure, compared in ACH vs. credit card payments: costs, speed and risk. MannyPay provides online payment gateways with integrations including Authorize.net, NMI and QuickBooks, so invoice payments can run through a controlled channel instead of email.
Start with the step that costs nothing: add the "bank details never change by email" notice to your invoice and statement templates this week, and tell your largest accounts about it by phone. Then decide how buyers will pay without ever seeing an account number. To review how your wholesale accounts pay today, request a free quote from MannyPay; a specialist responds within one business day.
Sources
This article is for general educational purposes and is not legal, tax or financial advice. Card network rules and state laws change; confirm current requirements for your business.


